Introduction
On November 14-15, 2008, a group of distinguished scholars met in the conference room of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's Learning Center and Money Museum to discuss issues relating to "Liquidity in Frictional Markets." Th e conference was cosponsored by the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking . Th e papers, which looked at markets for assets as diverse as houses, bank loans, and electronic funds transfer, all explored that amorphous concept called "liquidity" and how its presence-or absence-aff ects the economy. Th e papers also shared a methodological perspective, using search, network, and game theories as alternatives to Walrasian market clearing.
Monetary Policy
Th ree papers focused on monetary policy.
In "Elastic Money, Infl ation, and Interest Rate Policy," Allen Head and Junfeng Qiu study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which money plays a basic role in facilitating exchange, while aggregate shocks aff ect households asymmetrically and exchange may be conducted using either bank deposits (inside money) or fi at currency (outside money). A central bank controls the stock of outside money in the long run and responds to shocks in the short run using an interest rate policy that manages private banks' creation of inside money and infl uences households' consumption. Th e zero bound on nominal interest rates prevents the central bank from achieving effi ciency in all states. Long-run infl ation can improve welfare by mitigating the eff ect of this bound.
In "Price-Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy" Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher
Waller construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully fl exible, and money is essential for trade. Th eir main result is that if the central bank pursues a price-level target, it can control infl ation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short-run shocks to the economy. Th e optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates, which eff ectively smoothes consumption across states.
Nicolas L. Jacquet and Serene Tan, in "Money, Bargaining, and Risk Sharing," investigate money's dual role as a self-insurance device and a means of payment, when perfect risk-sharing is not possible and the two roles of money are disentangled. Th ey use a variant of Lagos and Wright's approach (2005) , where agents face a risk in the centralized market as follows. In the decentralized market, the main role for money is as a means of payment, while in the centralized market it is a self-insurance device. Th e authors show that state-contingent infl ation rates can improve agents' ability to self-insure in the centralized market, thereby improving the terms of trade in the decentralized market. Th e authors also characterize the optimal monetary policy.
Payments Systems
Four papers focused on the payments system and the nuts and bolts of the monetary system.
In "Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design," Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed Nosal describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is diffi cult to monitor. Th e approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. Th ey show that it is not effi cient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. Th ey do this without appealing to lottery devices, and argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring. In "Systemic Risk and Liquidity in Payment Systems," Gara M. Afonso and Hyun Song Shin study liquidity and systemic risk in high-value payment systems. Flows in such high-value systems are characterized by high velocity, meaning that the total amount paid and received is high relative to the stock of reserves. In such systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to fi nance outgoing payments, necessitating a high degree of coordination and synchronization. Th ey use lattice-theoretic methods to solve for the unique fi xed point of an equilibrium mapping and conduct comparative statics analyses on changes to the environment. Banks that attempt to conserve liquidity actually increase the demand for intraday credit and, ultimately, cause a disruption of payments. Additionally, when a bank is identifi ed as vulnerable to failure and other banks cancel payments to that bank, there are systemic repercussions.
Ricardo Lagos formulates a search-based asset-pricing model in which both equity shares and fi at money can be used as means of payment in "Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy in an Exchange Economy." It is then possible for him to characterize a family of optimal stochastic monetary policies. Every policy in this family implements Friedman's prescription of zero nominal interest rates. Under an optimal policy, equity prices and returns are independent of monetary considerations. Th e paper also studies a perturbation of the family of optimal policies that targets 
Trading Frictions in Asset Markets
Four papers looked at trading frictions in asset markets, continuing an infl uential recent trend to use search models to examine market microstructure.
Like Lagos, Yong Kim, in "Liquidity and Selection in Asset Markets with Search Frictions," also looks at an asset market subject to search frictions, but one in which both asset liquidity and market composition are determined endogenously. Th e analysis predicts that higher asset prices resulting from exogenously higher asset earnings imply a: In "Liquidity Provision in Capacity-Constrained Markets" Pierre-Olivier Weill studies a competitive, dynamic fi nancial market subject to a transient selling pressure, when market makers face a capacity constraint on the number of trades they can make with outside investors. Th is induces market makers to provide liquidity in order to manage their capacity constraint optimally over time: Th ey use slack capacity early to accumulate assets when the selling pressure is strong, so as to relax their capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when the selling pressure subsides. When the capacity constraint binds, the bid-ask spread is strictly positive, widening and narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories. Since the equilibrium asset allocation is constrained Pareto optimal, the time variations in bid-ask spreads are not symptomatic of ineffi cient liquidity provision. between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers), who meet in a search process. Projects randomly turn out a quick payout or a long-term payout that requires a rollover of the loan. Th e model generates, under proper parameter conditions, multiple steady states, and a small monitoring cost may generate a large macroeconomic eff ect. Th e model is simplifi ed for the analysis of the dynamics. Th ere is a continuum of cycles that are separated by crises, in which the stock of loans is reduced by a quantum amount of loan terminations.
Money, Liquidity, and Banks
Th ree papers explored the subtle relationships between money, liquidity, and banks.
"Information, Liquidity, and Asset Prices" by Benjamin Lester, Andrew Postlewaite, and Randall Wright studies how recognizability aff ects assets' acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certifi cates, bonds, or foreign currency. Th is idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less-recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never zero probability. Th is is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is diffi cult with private information. Th ese authors construct models in which agents outright reject assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Th us, information frictions generate liquidity diff erences without overly complicating the analysis.
In "Uncertainty, Infl ation, and Welfare," Jonathan Chiu and Miguel Molico use a microfounded search-theoretic monetary model to study the welfare costs and redistributive eff ects of infl ation when there is idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Th ey calibrate the model to match the empirical aggregate money demand and the distribution of money holdings across households, and study the eff ects of infl ation under the implied degree of market incompleteness. In the presence of imperfect insurance, the estimated long-run welfare costs of infl ation are on average 40 percent smaller than in a complete-markets, representative-agent economy. Furthermore, infl ation induces important redistributive eff ects across households. For example, the welfare gains of reducing infl ation from 10 percent to 0 percent is 0.59 percent of income. Moreover, the marginal redistributive eff ect of infl ation is decreasing in the rate of infl ation. Th ey conclude that accounting for wealth eff ects is important for the measurement of the welfare costs of infl ation, given that these eff ects are quantitatively signifi cant.
Valerie R. Bencivenga and Gabriele Camera, in "Banks, Liquidity Insurance, and Interest on Reserves in a Matching Model of Money," introduce banks resembling those in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) into a model of money and capital based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba and Wright (2003) . Agents can self-insure against random liquidity needs by carrying money balances, but they can also withdraw money from their bank deposits, although there is a real resource cost of doing so. Banks create liquidity by pooling agents' savings and by holding a portfolio of primary assets (money and capital) that maximizes depositors' expected utility. From an agent's perspective, banks provide liquidity insurance; they reduce or eliminate unused money balances. In the aggregate, banks shift the composition of savings toward investment in physical capital, which increases agents' rate of return on their savings. Th us, banks have the potential to improve welfare, despite their cost. When the withdrawal cost is suffi ciently small, agents save only through deposits, and banks provide complete liquidity insurance (there are no unused money balances). When the cost is moderate, agents optimally combine self-insurance (agents carry some money) and liquidity insurance through banks (some agents make withdrawals, and banks hold reserves). Th e optimal contract has a nonlinear schedule of interest rates on deposits in this case. When the cost is large, liquidity insurance becomes prohibitively expensive, and banks cannot improve welfare. Th e threshold levels of the cost are increasing in the infl ation rate. A policy of paying interest on reserves can reverse some or all of the distortionary eff ects of infl ation, provided the withdrawal cost is suffi ciently small, by inducing banks to off er specifi c incentivecompatible deposit contracts. Banks cannot observe agents' liquidity needs, and therefore deposit contracts cannot condition on them.
Th e conference covered a broad range of papers in terms of techniques used, questions addressed, and markets investigated. Perhaps the broad message of these papers is that a deeper understanding of market mechanisms and the frictions that lead to them can yield insights that are surprisingly relevant for policy questions.
